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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I look at Zimbabwe's moderately successful industrialisation experien-
ce, past, present and future. The lessons that can be drawn from this experience in 
comparison with what has happened in other countries, both more and less succesful, 
are: that there is a need for an intelligent state role; that both import substitution 
and export substitution are necessary; that emphasis on industry need not and must 
not be mean neglect of agriculture; and that the key problem is how to avoid enclave 
industrialisation which services urban elites but neglects the rest of the country and 
the region. 
1.THE PAST 
Zimbabwe has the most highly developed industrial sector of Africa south of the 
Sahara, apart from South Africa. There are two main factors that contributed to 
bringing this about: 
1. the relatively modest success of mining and agriculture, and 
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In contrast to the situation in Zambia with its copper, or Ghana with its cocoa, or a 
number of other economies in which one primary product was of dominating 
importance, Zimbabwe did not have a 'real business' that was manifestly the most 
profitable activity and from which manufacturing industry might have been seen as 
diverting investment. On the other hand, mining and agriculture were successful 
enough to make substantial and varied demands on industry for their inputs, from 
mining équipement for a dozen different sets of geological conditions to irrigation 
and tobacco-curing equipment, fertilisers and insecticides. 
Since Arrighi's seminal essay of 1967(1) the attainment of the white settlers of 
political power in 1923 has been seen as a crucial event. It is not clear that a desire 
for more domestic control over investment was a conscious aim of the colonialists 
at that stage, but political power immediately raised the possibility of investment for 
the long-term future of the colony, rather than the short to medium-run profitability 
for metropolitan shareholders, as tended to remain the criterion in other colonies. 
Thus began a state-led process of industrialisation favouring settler interests, in part 
at the expense of the economically dominant British South Africa Company wich 
still controlled mineral rights and owned the Wankie Colliery and the railway. Local 
capital in the 1920s and 1930s was predominantly agricultural, but small-scale 
miners (up to a thousand in number) were competing with the larger foreign-owned 
mines, and manifacturing industry was beginning to supply a range of consumer 
goods to the settler population, and to seek protection against imports. The 1930s 
saw the Tobacco Marketing Act (1936), designed to strenghten the power of tobacco 
farmers against the monopolistic United Tobacco Company, the establishment of the 
Electricity Supply Commission, and the setting up of the roasting plant, as a disguised 
subsidy to small-scale domestic goldminers. In the 1940s major state investments 
were made in the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company (now Zisco) and in cotton 
ginnery. Both of these provided a big stimulus to downstream private manufacturers 
(as well as to cotton growners in the latter case), and manufacturing industry began 
a steady rise from about 10 % of GDP before the war to 20 % in 1965, whilst 
agriculture declined in relative terms to about 15 % and mining to about 7 %. Isolation 
and the economic conditions of World War II and its aftermath provided natural 
protection, but during the years of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland 
(1954-1963), a complicated tariff structure was introduced, and after gaining 
preferences in their markets, Southern Rhodesian industry was stimulated by demand 
from its two less industrialised partners. A complex of opportunities and state 
responses not available to ordinary colonies thus allowed the development of an 
industrial structure with few if any parallels outside the independent dominions. 
246 However these opportunities were never pursued unambiguously. As industrial 
capital grew it developed a need for a larger market, and as it was not yet interna-
tionally competitive this meant the internal (or federal) market. This in turn required 
the expansion of black purchasing power through restoring the viability of black 
agriculture, and thus it came into conflict with the politically more powerful agricul-
tural capital, the white middle class and white workers, who therefore combined to 
close off that avenue of expansion by the election of the Rhodesian Front in 1962. 
Nevertheless, enforced protection during the UDI period gave an unexpected further 
stimulus to import substitution, and manufacturing's shares of GDP reached 25 % 
by 1974, and with continuing protection after independence, over 30 % in 1986. 
Since 1966, tariffs have been relatively unimportant, with quantitive restrictions on 
imports being imposed so as to bring the total value of imports in line with export 
earnings. Because of the shortage of foreign exchange, initially arising because of 
sanctions on Rhodesian exports, any manufacturer who could demonstrate a 
capability for local production of any item was very likely to gain protection. 
Therefore it is important to appreciate that circumstances played a major role in 
creating a climate conducive to the development of industry: although the state was 
somewhat interventionist as just discussed, 'natural protection', World War II and 
UDI also played a major role. Indeed, the professed ideology throughout was of a 
free market, open-economy nature which was at odds with the interventionist, 
semi-autarchic policies actually being pursued. Thus it is ironic that successful 
industrialisation followed from a policy that the dominant ideology would have 
prevented had circumstances not over-ruled. Government however did not play a 
very large direct role in industry, although its catalytic effect in steel and cotton were 
probably crucial. Iron and steel were denationalised in the late 1950s, but government 
again increased its stake to a majority position in the UDI period, after a major 
expansion resulted in high financial liabilities when the sanctions-busting of the 
Austrian partner was exposed. The main direct intervention was through the In-
dustrial Development Corporation (IDC) which was set up in 1963 with capital of 
1 million from government and private institutions, and charged with aiding develop-
ment through strategic investments. These were, however, invariably minority 
investments, and the IDC appears to have acted, without government interference, 
as a minor investment company. 
Background 
After independence, industrialisation was identified as the key long-term require-
ment for economic development. Aspects involved in formulating an industrial 
strategy included the dominance by foreign and settler capital, the orientation 
towards production for an elite, the consequent need for an expanded state role, the 
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ture and the mining, the pressure exerted by the World Bank, and the need to raise 
the proportion of the population in employment. I do not have space to discuss all 
these questions explicitly, and so will concentrate on the role of the state, the impact 
of the World Bank, and export strategy. This will enable an attempt to be made to 
assess the character, strengths and weaknesses of the 'Zimbabwe model' of in-
dustrialisation. First, however, some factual background. 
In the years after 1980 the state slowly developed a somewhat greater role in industry, 
with the IDC both taking over a number of ailing companies, and becoming involved 
in a wider range of investments, sometimes of a majority nature; in 1983 it had total 
assets of about ZW$ 40 million, under 1 % of total industrial assets. In 1985 it was 
expanded and became 100 % government owned, but remained self-financing, and 
in early 1988 its capital was increased tenfold to ZW$ 100 million prior to a new 
expanded role. It now owns companies in general engineering, film processing, 
clothing, furniture, vehicle assembly, glass, stainless-steel products and pencils; it 
has investments in firms making aluminium products, hosiery, abrasives, chemicals, 
stoves and electronics. It has recently invested in joint ventures with local companies 
(making polypropylene bags for agriculture) and foreign companies (an explosives 
factory with Swedish interests), and is involved in major new developments which 
could lead to the production of chemical pulp and paper, caustic soda, plate glass 
and copper tubes. After the formation of the Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation (ZMDC), however, it sold its mining interests, including the Kamativi 
tin mine. 
Government has also made direct (usually controlling) investments in CAPS (phar-
maceuticals), Zimpapers (publishing), Heinz-Olivine (oils, fats and canned food) and 
Zimbank, and it has recently acquired a large interest in the largest company of all, 
Delta Corporation. Most of these expansions of state ownership followed from 
tactical decisions relating to such factors as the need for cheap drugs for the expanded 
health service and the reduction of South African influence in key areas such as 
information and banking; all involved market purchase of shares by the state with 
no suggestion of expropriation, although government was often able to drive a hard 
bargain. 
State and market 
A more formal state role in industrial development was promised in Growth with 
Equity in 1981 in the proposal for a Zimbabwe Development Corporation, which 
was not in fact established until 1988. The slow progress in this direction is clearly 
associated with the more general failure to grapple with the problem of planning for 
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ownership of the majority of industry. Despite the fanfares associated with the 
Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83 - 1984/85 (TNDP) and the First 
Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986 - 1990 (FFYNDP), no coherent in-
dustrialisation plan was included, and no instruments or institutions for such a plan 
were processed. Many industrial projects were included, but these were largely put 
in on an ad hoc basis, depending almost entirely on whether they were already being 
considered by a company or other interest group; there was no prioritisation or 
attempt to relate them to each other or to other industries needed as part of a planned 
process of industrialisation. 
In fact since independence, state policy towards industry has been very conservative, 
with the inherited structures of state intervention and protection through control 
foreign exchange and trade, being preserved with only marginal changes. This may 
seem paradoxical in that these structures were set up largely as defensive measures 
against sanctions, and were designed to safeguard the privileges of the white elite. 
Why, we might ask, should they be preserved by a government inspired by Marxism-
Leninism, and seeking greater equality? The answer probably lies in the new state's 
desire for control over the mainly white or foreign owners of industry, its desire not 
to risk de-industrialisation by removing protection, and a stated desire to plan the 
economy. But it is much less clear that instruments to protect a minority regime 
against sanctions are the best ones to protect and develop an industry for an 
independent nation. The conservatism has certainly preserved industry and allowed 
it to grow modestly (the volume of output in 1989 was 31 % higher than in 1980), 
but there has also, despite the rhetoric, been a conservatism in functional ideology. 
I shall try to explain why I say this: we have seen above that before independence 
industry developed under protection, despite the open-market economy ideology of 
the colonial and rebel governments. But even after independence, under a nominally 
Marxist regime, the government - or at any rate the ministry of finance, economic 
planning and development (MFEPD) - from the start made regular statements that 
its aim was liberalisation of the foreign exchange and trade regimes, even if in part 
this may be seen in response to pressure from the World Bank and the IMF. What is 
clear is that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative to liberalisation 
through the construction of a coherent plan for deepened industrialisation, although 
precisely that has been called for by some other sections of government. The controls 
provided by existing structures have been used primarily to maintain an overall 
balance of payments, secundarily to sustain and develop export-earning (or import-
saving) industries, and only intermittently and on an ad hoc basis have they been 
used, as they might have been, to pursue longer-term objectives. 
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except at the purely rhetorical level, this has not related to any grand socialist strategy 
or any attempt to introduce central planning: state interventions have always had 
parallel pragmatic justifications. The confusion between socialist rhetoric and con-
servative pragmatism may be most clearly seen in the introduction to the TNDP 
where in one paragraph there is an abrupt transition from a statement of the need to 
develop socialism and greater equality, to a commitment to promoting the conditions 
for greater foreign investment, with the clear implication that the authors believe that 
the latter can promote the former. 
Liberalisation also appears to be a theoretical idea for the white dominated business 
community, with a phased implementation of it gaining verbal support from the 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) in 1987. In practice the members of 
the CZI are loud in their condemnation of particular breaches of protection, and they 
generally recognise that they benefit from state interventions, not only in providing 
protection but also (for established firms) reasonably guaranteed foreign-exchange 
allocations at a favourable exchange rate. 
The continuing foreign-exchange shortage and the fear of losing control of the 
balance of payments therefore prevented any significant moves towards liberalisa-
tion on the part of government until this year. Thus we find a continuity between pre-
and post-independence policy applying also at another level: external factors have 
forced a policy broadly favourable to industrialisation despite the official desire to 
operate a different policy. 
The theme that I shall therefore be developing is that Zimbabwe's policies towards 
industrialisation have been broadly correct, but inadequately theorised, and pursued 
with insufficient priority. They have been prey to short-run balance-of-payments 
constraints which have often resulted in perverse outcomes and serious inefficiencies 
which could have been avoided. Consequently they have been unable to respond 
adequately to the continuous sniping from the World Bank from its base of a more 
coherent (but I believe incorect) orthodox, free-market theory of development. 
The World Bank's pressure 
The World Bank and the Competitiveness of Zimbabwean Industry 
The 'Jansen Report'(2) on the international competitiveness of Zimbabwe's industry, 
was commissioned in 1982 in connection with the first loan that Zimbabwe received 
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followed four years later. 
Now both reports were highly critical of Zimbabwe's past and present industrialisa-
tion and foreign-exchange policies, so it is important to appreciate at the outset that 
even in the reports' own terms the overall results they obtained pronounced a quite 
favourable verdict on Zimbabwe's achievements: 
Although Zimbabwe manufacturing may not be clearly efficient in an absolute sense, 
it is very efficient compared to other manufacturing sectors in Africa and many other 
developing countries.(4) 
Whereas the overall DRC(5) was estimated at 1.27, similar studies had given 1.95 
for Ghana, 1.83 for Cameroon and 1.34 for Ivory Coast. 
As the last-named country is frequently praised by the World Bank for its relatively 
open policies(6), it should have seemed all the more remarkable that Zimbabwe 
should show a better result, after nearly two decades with a relatively closed 
economy, during which it added to its industry a range of more sophisticated 
processes requiring more protection as infants in any case. 
Belli's solution is to express surprise at the success (despite the system), and then^to 
pass to a catalogue of what it sees as disadvantages of the system (some real, some 
already solved, some merely disadvantages to the operation of capitalism), without 
ever mentioning any advantages.(7) All World Bank or IMF reports in the end turn 
what evidence they have to recommanding the standard free-market package, 
modified only slightly for a country's specificity.(8) Even if one where to accept that 
this package was appropriate for a country (like Zambia) in serious trouble after a 
commodity collapse and failed industrialisation strategy (although this could of 
course be challenged), it does not necessarily follow that it would be appropriate for 
a country with a significantly more successful industrial record. One is therefore 
tempted to ask how successful Zimbabwe's policies would have to be before the 
World Bank would be obliged to alter its prescription. 
My detailed criticisms of 'Jansenism' follow in the next section, and fall under two 
main headings: misuses of the methodology and neglect of the reservations made by 
more sophisticated practitioners of the methodology such as Bhagwati.(9) 
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The Jansen study attempted to survey the ten main branches of manufacturing 
industry, investigating 122 firms representing 62 % of the output in 1981. (In fact as 
it restricted attention to only three products per company it covered only a tiny 
fraction of the 6200 products listed in Products of Zimbabwean Industries in 
1980.(10)) The efficiency of these firms relative to international competition was 
judged by calculating their domestic resource costs. Where these were above unity 
Zimbabwe would, according to the ideology, gain by closing down such firms and 
devoting the resources so freed to ones with DRCs below unity. 
The methodology of the Jansen Report is thus very simple (or simplistic?); however, 
it is very difficult to judge the quality of the data inputs.(ll) The report in fact falls 
short of acceptable standards even in terms of its own methodology. The DRC 
approach (even ignoring the caveats as to the use to which its results may be put) 
requires genuine shadow pricing of factor costs, painstaking collection of interna-
tional prices of tradables, and more reliable calculation of the appropriate exchange 
rate. If one wished to be cynical one could say that Jansen had considerable difficulty 
in achieving a DRC above unity for Zimbabwe, and this achievement depended on 
both overvaluing the social price of domestic factors and undervaluing the social 
price of value added in the output of Zimbabwean industries. 
As countries in early stages of development (Japan and South Korea are probable 
examples) have often tolerated negative value added in infant industries for moderate 
periods, with consequent large and even negative DRCs, a DRC value of 4 (as found 
by Jansen for some metal industries in Ziambabwe) may be seen as quite moderate. 
And yet this figure is used to imply extreme inefficiency, for it states that $ 8 million 
of domestic resources are earning or saving only $ 2 million of foreign exchange, 
whereas if transferred to an activity with DRC of unity they would be earning or 
saving $ 8 million. Even if we accept the average DRC of 1.27, with most sectors of 
industry having values between 0.9 and 1.4, a value approaching 4 (with 4.4 for Zisco 
alone) appears to be damning. This however is an artefact of the way that DRCs are 
calculated: it can easily be shown(12) that a rise in revenue of only 30 % would 
suffice to reduce the DRC to unity. 
The ideological blinkers of the Jansen Report result in it attributing all variations in 
DRCs to inefficiencies in the trade regime. Indeed Jansen goes further, at one 
point(13) even stating that market imperfections are 'considered to be entirely the 
result of government policy'. Jansen, like the World Bank, advocates a larger role 
of the market, including the world market; in the context of an 'efficiency analysis', 
'market imperfections' becomes a loaded term implying that there is no alternative 
but a change in government policy in the direction of trade liberalisation. 
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1.27,(14) it could hardly be claimed that Zimbabwe should not be manufacturing, 
but should concentrate on mining or agriculture. However, with a spread of 0.66 to 
3.62 amongst the branches of manufacturing industry, the possibility of serious 
inefficiency in some activities is raised. And in some of these branches individual 
companies scored still higher (up to 5.44) on the DRC scale. 
I am not therefore suggesting that such figures (if correctly calculated - see below) 
should be ignored, but a reasonable approach would seek what lessons were to be 
drawn in terms of installing more modern plant and equipment, much of which had 
been run down following 14 years of sanctions. Jansen, however, despite conceding 
that for the metal products sector 'a major reason for the poor performance of the 
firms in this activity is the fall in the world prices for steel and metallic minerals' 
nevertheless concluded that '...the country would save foreign exchange by closing 
them down instead of running down their fixed capital. The ensuing massive layoffs 
of workers would be undesirable, but a study of alternative product lines and more 
efficient use of existing plant and machinery should be undertaken'. When would 
such a study not be good advice? The important point concerns the long-run prospects 
for industry rather than short-run savings during a world slump. 
The World Bank's Industrial Sector Memorandum: The Belli Report 
The Belli Report(15) was the first substantial in-house analysis of Zimbabwean 
manufacturing industry by the World Bank. As such it is interesting to discover 
whether it takes account of the almost universal and damning criticism of the Jansen 
report (privately admitted to have effectively discredited it), which led to the latter's 
rejection by the Zimbabwe government. Unfortunately once again, although Belli 
begins with a brief history of Zimbabwe's experience with industrialisation, and 
discusses the specifics of Zimbabwean practice and institutions, the recommenda-
tions which follow are in all respects exactly those which someone with no 
knowledge of Zimbabwe, but familiarity with the World Bank, would have predicted. 
In its consideration of how the present structure of manufacturing industry has arisen, 
the Belli report acknowledges that the effective start of industrialisation occurred 
during the Second World War under natural protection and some state initiatives in 
the steel and textile industries; that the Federation with what are now Zambia and 
Malawi from 1954-1963 benefitted Zimabwean industry internally through widening 
its market, and externally through tariff protection; and that the enforced protection 
during the UDI period resulted in the creation of about half of present industry, 
protecting some 6000 distinguishable products as compared with some 600 before 
UDI. What the report plays down(16) is that this was a process involving a high 
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not always in detail). It also attempts to play down the importance of the UDI period, 
when protection and control were most visible, by emphasising that a half of industry 
was in place beforehand (implying wrongly that this had arisen primarily through 
market forces)(17), and that structural changes inside the manufacturing sector 
during UDI were slight.(18) 
The scientific and objective tone of the Belli report is in fact spurious, for the essence 
of the scientific method is the rejection or modification of hypotheses in the light of 
conflicting evidence. However, as in the case of Jansen, the Belli mission seems to 
have started from a received and inviolable theory, so that the task it set itself became 
one of fitting facts that could not be ignored into the framework, without modifying 
it in any way. At its weakest, when it is obliged to report that Zimbabwe has had 
success with policies of a type that it recommends should be abolished, the report 
can do no better than state that this success is surprising! Equally, no mention is made 
of countries which have had failures with World Bank policies, or those which have 
had success with opposite policies.(19) 
The propagandiste intent is also evident, despite the sober language, through the fact 
that only arguments against the present system and its disadvantages are presented. 
In some cases we may in fact agree with their recommendations, but this would be 
as a result of a judgement that the disadvantages outweight the advantages; however 
the latter are never even referred to by Belli, although in my view they are crucial. 
As with Jansen the over-riding criterion employed is that of short-run efficiency: 
present policies are judged inefficient because the market would dictate a different 
pattern of relative prices and resource allocation. Considerations of equity, of a desire 
to construct a socialist society, even of the need for structural change for develop-
ment, are implicitly relegated to a subsidiary category whose main characteristic is 
that of imposing costs above the level of a market outcome. This implies an 
underlying assumption that the basic structure of the economy is sound: all that is 
needed is to allow market forces to favour those actvities for which a comparartive 
advantage already exists. The report, in other words, denies the need to promote 
structural change (despite this being an oft-repeated government aim), either for 
social justice or for the purpose of developing comparative advantage in new areas. 
The primary aim of the Belli report is thus to accelerate the process of reintegrating 
the Zimbabwean economy into the world market system in such way as to make any 
attempt at an independent policy (even of economic nationalism, let alone of 
socialism) impossible. 
As the conceptual and methodological weaknesses of the Jansen report had been 
severely criticised(20) and as the report was rejected by government, the World Bank 
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retain the conclusions, and to quote the results of the earlier study where it was unable 
to repeat the field work. 
The Belli Report is therefore by and large only implicitly critical of Jansen(21), 
despite quoting significantly more favourable DRC values from its own field work; 
although this changes the specific recommendations, the general ones are untouched. 
Thus Zisco, which on Jansen's figures should have been written off immediately(22), 
is now judged to be potentially very efficient with a significant comparative ad-
vantage (i.e. DRCs below unity) if appropriate adjustments are made to the crude 
figures.(23) 
The report gives a number of reasons why it obtained such a startingly different result 
from Jansen, including the subsequent devaluation and her failure to calculate proper 
shadow prices. These confirm some of the earlier criticisms made of Jansen and her 
uncritical use of the DRC methodology, and in particular the extreme sensitivity of 
the ratio to changes in one component of the denominator.(24) But if a reinvestigation 
of Zisco can change a DRC of 4.4 (meaning, let us remember, that for every US$ of 
value created, US$ 4.4 worth of domestic factors are consumed - i.e. US$ 3.4 are 
wasted), to a DRC of less than unity, how reliable should we regard her other 
calculations? And even if they were accurate how useful are they if they are so 
sensitive to change? And what weight should we attach to her overall DRC figure 
for manufacturing industry of 1.27? Should it really have been about 0.9? Or 0.5? 
(Belli's other recalculations relate to only five firms in the textile and fertiliser 
sub-sectors, and they also are significantly, though not quite so dramatically, below 
Jansen's). Nevertheless (despite privately expressed embarassment) the Belli report 
explicitly admits to drawing on the Jansen study, and indeed falls back on it 
repeatedly. 
The Belli Report shares with Jansen an obsession with static comparative advantage 
(which is what DRCs really measure) to the near exclusion of longer run considera-
tions. It is accepted that it is common for governments to protect industry, but the 
reasons for this are not discussed. Neither the exception to neoclasical theory of 
infant-industry protection, nor structuralist, nor socialist theories of industrialisation 
are mentioned(25). Equally one could not guess that 'model' countries, like Japan 
and South Korea at early stages of their development (to say nothing of the socialist 
countries), consciously decided to create new comparative advantages through 
protection; that is they invested heavily in industries which had high DRCs at the 
expense of existing ones with lower values. In arguing against the present system, 
the report implies that it might have been necessary during UDI, but that those 
conditions no longer obtain. This may well be true, but it misses the point that if the 
high degree of protection and the discretional (as opposed to market-determined) 
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argue), there is no reason why these elements cannot be used now under more 
favourable conditions. The boot should really be on the other foot, for it is the report's 
recommendation that a free-market, export-led startegy could generate the type of 
success seen in South Korea, that assumes conditions that no longer obtain. Aside 
from the fact that the internal components of the South Korean strategy were far from 
free market, few would maintain that the favourable world market conditions enj oyed 
by that country in the crucial take-off period of the 1960s obtain now, or that (unlike 
the case with planned allocation mechanisms), developing countries can do anything 
significant about it. 
Jansen and Belli in Perspective 
In effect these two reports present the pattern of DRCs amongst branches of 
manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe as a 'hit list'. The arguments in Jansen amount 
to the claim that any shift from a high DRC firm to a lower DRC firm (it is irrelevant 
whether they are both above or below unity, or whatever) will increase efficiency: 
that is the spread of DRCs is (by definition) too large. Jansen's arguments lead to 
the conclusion that in the end all resources ougth to be employed in the single activity 
with lowest DRC. If this ridiculous conclusion (implicit also in Belli) is rejected, 
where does one stop on the way towards such an outcome? The report offers no 
guidance; it might be quite soon, or it is even possible that Zimbabwe might have 
already gone too far towards this extreme. Any position of differential DRCs is open 
to the arguments they make. 
In order to promote international competitiveness the Belli report suggests that either 
the most capital-intensive new machinery has to be imported, or real wage-rates have 
to be squeezed down to the levels of the main far Eastern competitors. Both options 
are inconsistent with Zimbabwe's socialist aims in the short run. Devaluation could 
increase the competitiveness of the industry, but at the expense of making imports 
more expensive, reducing living standards, and transferring income from importers 
and their customers (industrialists and consumers of industrial products) to exporters 
(largely foreign-owned mining, ranching and plantations companies and settler 
farmers). 
The Jansen and Belli Reports sit so centrally in the mainstream of World Bank and 
IMF advice that their major procedural failings merge imperceptibly, through the 
ignoring of Bhagwati's caveats, into the ideologically loaded nature of World Bank 
methodology in general. The methodology, in subtler hands and with painstaking 
data collection, can certainly derive reliable knowledge on static comparative ad-
vantage (and thereby provide a useful guide to short-run efficiency);(26) there is, 
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dealing as it should with several dimensions of the future: the gaining of economies 
of scale by infant industries, learning by doing, technological change internally and 
externally, short and long-term changes in world markets, and so forth. 
Zimbabwe's alternative 
The Belli Report, recognising that there would be strong political resistance to its 
proposals, described what it calls 'a second best alternative'(27). This would involve 
various measures designed to promote exports at roughly the present exchange rate, 
to reward exporters with forex allocations for domestic-market production, and to 
make it easier to import essential spare parts and similar commodities. Import, price 
and investment controls would have to be retained in this case: Belli saw this as a 
negative factor because of 'the distortions that they introduce' - i.e. relative to the 
world market prices(28). I would however argue that these controls could be 
simplified and reformed in several ways, both so as to increase the efficiency of their 
operation and also so as to allow the introduction of more economic analysis into the 
decision-making process. 
In fact Zimbabwe was already following just such a policy, partly as a result of earlier 
World Bank advice. Thus it operates an export-revolving fund, in which companies 
with firm export orders can obtain effectively whatever forex they require in order 
to purchase essential imported inputs (and in some cases spare parts or even new 
capital equipment): this was originally funded by the World Bank, but was soon 
operating from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) as part of its normal proce-
dures. There is also an export-incentive scheme, and a domestic-market forex 
allocation based on the extent to which firms raise export levels. In addition a policy 
has been followed of managing the exchange rate of the Zimbabwe dollar so that its 
value as measured by a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies has been falling 
slowly in real terms. These measures have raised the volume of exports of manufac-
tured goods every year for the last six years. 
Thus Zimbabwe has been following successful policies, unlike most countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa), as evidenced by an average growth rate 
in the 1980s of almost 4 %, in which 'non-traditional manufactures' have played a 
large role. Undoubtedly these policies could still be significantly improved, in terms 
of raising export earnings and in terms of more rapid growth of industry for the 
domestic, regional and wider export markets. But I will conclude this section by 
making two further points: 
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countries (NICs), in particular South Korea, where contrary to orthodox mythol-
ogy, there was significant government intervention, protection of the domestic 
market, highly selective quantitative controls on imports, the linking of import 
licences to export performance, and a battery of other export-promoting measures 
having little to do with short-run market prices. Zimbabwe has been less succesful, 
partly because it has had much less consistent or thoroughgoing policies, partly 
because of a much less favourable geographical situation (it is landlocked, and it 
has been subject to déstabilisation by South Africa), partly because it received 
proportionately much less aid and fewer trade concessions, and partly because the 
world trading environment was much less favourable in the 1980s than in the 
equivalent period of the 1960s for the NICs. 
2. For all Belli's concession that such policies are at least 'second best' (i.e. not 
totally wrong or counterproductive, merely theoretically sub-optimal according to 
orthodox ideology), the World Bank has in practice acted to reduce the extent of 
their success. Thus as the time that the beneficial results of the export-revolving 
fund were being recorded, Zi mbabwe began negotiati ons with the Bank for a larger 
fund which would have extended the benefits to the agricultural and mineral 
exporters also. Such a fund was agreed in principle in negotiations with the Bank's 
country staff, and was at the point of being signed when it was vetoed by the 
ideologues at the highest level of the Bank. Four years later it has still not been 
made available. The price Zimbabwe was being asked (and refused) to pay 
involved faster devaluation, a commitment to thoroughgoing liberalisation, and, 
it is believed, an end to socialist rhetoric. As the new fund would have improved 
an already successful policy, it does not seem too cynical to argue that the Bank 
refused to support it precisely because it might have succeeded only too well. 
Zimbabwe, by then having a good credit rating, was nevertheless able to borrow 
commercially to set up a similar fund of its own. This of course was on much less 
favourable terms than the World Bank could have offered, so the outcome is that the 
latter has in effect deliberately depressed Zimbabwe's exports in pursuit of the 
imposition of an ideology that argues for the primacy of international trade! 
The World Bank victorious? 
During 1988 and 1989, with rapidly rising exports and falling debt-service ratio(29), 
calls for liberalisation lost much of their force. However, it was also clear that the 
existing system was operating less and less efficiently in that there were increasing 
delays in making decisions, and increasingly widespread corruption (the evidence 
258 from the Sandura Commission(30) was only the tip of a large iceberg) was throwing 
the rationality of the foreign-exchange allocation system into doubt. In 1988 the 
widely respected and dynamic permanent secretary in the ministry of trade and 
commerce was sacked and charged with corruption - on a very minor matter which 
he claimed was dug up precisely because he had refused to go along with major 
malpractice by his superiors. The consequence for a time was that almost no decisions 
were taken on foreign-exchange allocation in the ministry, because more junior staff 
feared that any discretion could in principle lead to charges of corruption from 
quarters that felt that they had lost out. 
Nevertheless, this was still the system that had delivered positive results, and the 
most obvious diagnosis should have been for reform. This is what was argued by the 
ministries of industry and technology, and labour and manpower development. The 
more orthodox ministry of finance, economic planning and development (MFEPD), 
however, plainly wished to reach an accomodation with the World Bank: an event 
seen as highly symbolic by the press - the marriage of the minister's daughter to the 
son of the World Bank's resident in Zimbabwe - also took place in 1988. The 
compromise reached seems to be that a phased liberalisation over five years has been 
agreed on, and may be implemented from July this year. Very careful monitoring 
will take place, so that firms will not become unviable simply because of earlier 
inability to retool caused by forex shortage, or because of closure of local sources of 
supply. Nevertheless the basis does seem to be a switch from quantitative controls 
to a tariff-based system, which will remove from government a major instrument for 
planning industrialisation policy.(31) Since, as we have seen, such instruments have 
not actually been used to a significant extent, it is possible that the net result may yet 
be beneficial, if control is retained over strategic parameters of policy, including the 
tariff structure (this will mean resisting World Bank demands for lower and flat-rate 
tariffs). One pointer to possible disadvantages, however, is seen in the reported 'own 
goal' by government when it introduced a preliminary liberalisation measure late 
last year, raising the level above which importers need to seek an import licence from 
ZW$ 500 to ZW$ 5000. This was intended to ease greatly the obtaining of spare 
parts by industry. Instead there is evidence of a big increase in the import of luxury 
consumer goods, especially computers, video recorders and colour TVs, and a 
halving of the black market value of the Zimbabwe dollar as those with spare local 
funds try to mobilise the necessary foreign exchange. This may be only a small 
fortaste of the consequences that opponents of liberalisation have warned of, should 
the phasing, monitoring, or consequent corrective action prove deficient. 
259 3. THE FUTURE 
Attempts to predict the future almost always fail, even (or especially) when formal 
mathematical models are available. Intuition (or guesswork) based on detailed 
knowledge of an economy often provides as good a guide as any, but only if neglected 
factors do not turn out to be significant. Here I am going to retreat onto the safer 
ground of scenario construction, based on certain explicit assumptions (for some of 
which I have no secure grounds). The assumptions are: that there will be no more 
than one severe drought affecting core agricultural areas every five years (the south 
and west will probably be affected every other year); that déstabilisation by South 
Africa will cease to be a significant factor and that most of Zimbabwe's trade will 
switch to using Mozambican ports. 
The two main factors are unpredictable internal and regional policy outcomes, and 
together they lead to six main scenarios. The first relates to the question of liberalisa-
tion of economic policy in Zimbabwe; here it is possible that: 
1. government will retreat into perpetuating the present system without substantial 
reforms; 
2. it may reform the system or implement phased partial liberalisation which places 
control over key economic instruments in the hands of active planners; 
3. rapid liberalisation may occur, turning the majority of decisions over to the 
market. 
Regionally, South Africa may: 
a. reach a settlement in which market policies and an inflow of foreign capital 
restore it to a major sub-imperialist role; or 
b. the settlement may be of a nationalistic, even socialist, nature, with South Africa 
becoming a valued member of the SADCC. 
Of the six possible combinations of the above two factors, I will elaborate only 2b 
and 3a here. 3a, which I shall refer to as the World Bank model, would result in rapid 
de-industrialisation. 2b, an extension of the existing Zimbabwe model, offers the 
only significant hope of long-run industrialisation, and therefore of any form of 
meaningful development. 
260 The World Bank Model 
Liberalisation should in theory raise the (static) efficiency of an economy because 
less efficient firms and activities will be forced to become more efficient or else they 
will be replaced by more efficient importing or by new firms. Now almost all 
sub-sectors of manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe contain efficient and inefficient 
firms, but because of the small size of the economy, many products are produced in 
a highly monopolistic context. Therefore over-rapid liberalisation would produce 
rather random results, with lines of production disappearing in favour of imports not 
because Zimbabwe has no comparative advantage in their production, but rather 
because they happen to be produced by less efficient firms (or by efficient firms 
which have not been granted the foreign exchange to invest in modern technology). 
Initially therefore only some highly efficient sections of industry would certainly 
survive, but eventually many of these would lose their local linkages, and eventually 
there would probably be few survivors not tied to mining and agriculture and basic 
food processing. 
With the proximity of an open South African economy of much greater size, 
rationalisation would reduce the Zimbabwean economy to a periphery of a periphery: 
relatively few industries, and probably no highly advanced ones, would survive in 
South Africa itself, and those which did would have a huge competitive advantage 
over their Zimbabwean equivalents. 
Static comparative advantage would be the prime criterion, and the integration of the 
region into the world economy would force specialisation in primary production: 
mineral products and a limited range of agricultural crops. Industry which added 
value to these would survive to some extent, but the most obvious source of 
comparative advantage - cheap labour - now has no relevance whatsoever to almost 
all manufacturing industries. It is noteworthy that whereas advocates of liberalisation 
offer an inflow of foreign investment as a job-creating consequence, very little 
private investment has flowed of recent years to any part of the Third World, and 
what has, has been of a remarkably capital-intensive nature. Almost no new invest-
ments in Zimbabwe recently (domestic or foreign) have created jobs for less than 
ZW$ 100,000 each.(32) These are the levels dictated by the need for competitiveness 
in the world market; a simple calculation shows that even investment at ZW$ 50,000 
would only create jobs for a tenth of Zimbabwe"s school-leavers even if the 
investement ratio rose to over 30 %. The World Bank model is thus a recipe for 
continuing poverty for a region which has been allocated the role of cheap commodity 
provision for the developed world, and which would provide remunerative employ-
ment for only a fraction of its population. 
261 The Zimbabwe Model 
Zimbabwe has industrialised - as almost all countries before it - on the basis of a 
measure of protection from more advanced economies, whether natural, arising from 
war or sanctions, or resulting from government policy. Naturally because protection 
is protection against more efficient firms and economies elsewhere, it is protection 
to present inefficiency. Preservation of industries because they happen to exist now, 
or creation of new industries because they are technologically possible (plans are 
current in Zimbabwe for establishing a machine-tools industry) cannot therefore be 
justified independent of considerations of future efficiency. 
But 'efficency' is a question-begging term. We could easily accept infant-industry 
protection on a mechanical basis for firms or activities which can demonstrate that 
they will be mature and internationally competitive in, say, ten years' time; even the 
World Bank might agree. More important is to look at the efficiency of an economy 
as a whole: an economy employing barely 10 % of its population (as Zimbabwe is 
now) and consigning the rest to subsistence and handouts, is neither efficient nor 
humane. But an economy spreading similar investment over most of its workforce 
(and thereby raising employment five-fold) would produce almost nothing at inter-
nationally competitive rates, and would therefore have to subsidise exports, thereby 
violating GATT, World Bank and IMF principles. 
Zimbabwe has not yet been able to follow such a policy very effectively, although 
since independence it has kept alive the possibility of switching to it, and as we have 
seen has developed a way of breaking into export markets that could be developed 
much further (learning from the South Korean experience for example). South Africa 
will face almost exactly the same dilemma, with the aspirations of its highly 
politically conscious population certain to be thwarted if World Bank policies are 
imposed. The sharpness of the contradiction in South Africa could still be resolved 
in a socialist revolution, but short of this may still allow a compromise or stand-off 
in which more egalitarian industry- and enployment-generating policies become a 
possibility. Both South Africa and the SADCC region, including Zimbabwe, could 
benefit from regional cooperation in this eventuality. There is no space here to spell 
out the details of corporation and specialisation that would be required (the SADCC 
provides a model for the very early stages), but I will conclude by making one rash 
prediction: that the failure of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies for 
other countries will become manifest during the next five years, so that a measure 
of space may become available for other countries and regions attempting in-
dustrialisation and modified structural adjustment on the Zimbabwe model rather 
than the World Bank one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Zimbabwe is not just an average African country. In many ways it does not even 
reflect the conventional picture of a 'Third World Country' (whatever this may be). 
In many respects the country defies classical development studies labels. Macro-
economic aggregates about its economy often hide more than they reveal. This makes 
any discussion about Zimbabwe's 10 years of independence a difficult undertaking. 
I have only worked some five years in Zimbabwe (which is much less than my 
esteemed colleagues today), and I admit to be intrigued as ever about its economy, 
politics and policies. 
Zimbabwe has by many standards a remarkably diversified economic structure. The 
country has a sizeable commercial agricultural sector, an important manufacturing 
sector and a relatively important mining sector (particularly because of its ex-
ports)^) 
In fact this diversity is maintained when looking at a lower level of aggregation. For 
a tropical country Zimbabwe has a highly diversified agricultural production (major 
crops are maize, tobacco, cotton, sugarcane, tea and coffee and a vast growing 
267 horticulture). In addition, it has a large livestock production both for meat and for 
dairy products. Last but not least, Zimbabwe is self sufficient in the production of 
its main staple food, maize. 
Its mining sector is not exclusively focussed on one mineral. For sure gold is the 
dominant mineral but it constitutes less than 50 % of the value of all mineral 
production. In addition there is coal, asbestos, nickel, copper and chrome ore. 
Furthermore there is a platinum mine in the pipeline while oil exploration is 
underway in the Zambesi valley. 
Also its manufacturing industry is remarkably diversified. It is not limited to basic 
consumer goods such as food, drinks and beverages and clothing and footwear but 
there is also a not insignificant intermediate industrial sector (e.g. chemicals, fer-
tilizers) and small capital goods industry (e.g. metal and metal products and transport 
assembly). 
If we look at the composition of exports, a similar diversity is found: the biggest 
export earner, tobacco, earns 18 % of total merchandise exports, followed or 
sometimes surpassed by gold with about the same percentage (18 %). Many develop-
ing countries depend often for more than half or even three quarters of their export 
earnings on one single item, be that coffee, cocoa or copper. 
All this diversity with an average per capita gross national income of no more than 
some ZW$ 480 in 1986. 
The other interesting aspect of Zimbabwe's economic history is that a lot of what 
happened with and to Zimbabwe was not by design of any grand scheme or deliberate 
economic policy: Cecil Rhodes and his British South African Company actually had 
a grand scheme about gold but didn't find gold at the scale they hoped for. The 
attraction of settlers (for small scale mining) and the partitioning out of the occupied 
lands became the driving force. Industrialization was spurred by another accident, 
namely the Second World War, although the larger market of the Federation helped 
it grow. International sanctions gave a second boost to industrialization in the 60s 
and early 70s and these same sanctions forced a liberal free market UDI government 
to become very interventionist in assistance to the industry. On the basis of these 
arguments one might be tempted to conclude that it would be better not to design 
any grand scheme or policy but leave it to history to be benevolent to Zimbabwe! 
This, of course, is deliberately overdrawn but it calls for greater modesty in relation 
to grand schemes and ambitious government policies. To this I will address myself 
later on. 
268 ZIMBABWE'S FIRST 10 YEARS 
The immediate post-independence boom was cut short by a severe drought, poor 
world economic performance as well as acts of South African destabilization. The 
average economic growth was no more than 1,6 % per annum over the first five years. 
The second half of the 1980s gave a more favourable picture. One may achieve an 
average for the decade as a whole of some 3,4 % of real growth per annum. 
Given the high population growth (of nearly 3 %), per capita income declined in the 
first half, and slighty improved during the second half of the 1980s. 
The 'boom-bust' performance of the economy is also reflected in the balance of 
payments. Its current account deficit worsened in the early and mid 80s only to 
recover and turn into a surplus in the latter part of the decade. It should be added 
though that in comparison to the boom-bust fluctuations of other countries those in 
Zimbabwe are much smaller and influenced by non-economic factors, such as 
recurrent droughts. 
The direction of trade also shifted away from South Africa (the Zimbabwean exports 
to the RSA were in 1981 22 % of the total exports, in 1987 this had declined to 11 
%). Exports moved towards the EEC (from 26 % in 1981 to 37 % in 1987). For 
imports these changes are less pronounced. The SADCC trade shares have not 
changed dramatically and have remained well below 10 %. 
The foreign debt is very limited. In comparison to other countries Zimbabwe has a 
low debt service ratio. It reached a peak of 35 % in 1987 but currently it stands at 
around 20 %. 
The most important changes in the economy since Independence have been men-
tioned already in the previous papers. In agriculture one could see a major increase 
in the participation of the communal or peasant sector, particularly in commercial 
crops such as maize and cotton. Up to some 51.000 households were given access 
to land through resettlement schemes. At the same time, however, the introduction 
of the agricultural minimum wage together with the earlier drought caused a shake 
out in commercial farming where employment went down with nearly 60.000 jobs 
to around 275.000. 
In industry there has been even less 'structural change'. The most noteworthy is the 
relative decline of metal and metal products, and the relative increase in drinks and 
tobacco and chemical and petroleum products subsectors. On balance the 80s 
269 resulted in a 3,6 % increase in real output per annum and a 2,6 % annual increase in 
employment. 
The most important change is found with regard to the services sector: the rapid 
expansion of education, health and public administration itself. It is also here where 
the government of Zimbabwe achievements are best known and widely recognized. 
Industrial sector 
The industrial sector with all its diversity is relatively small. There are less than 1100 
units according to the Census of Manufacturing of 1986/7 (was 1340 in 1982). They 
may produce as mabny as 6000 products but markets are small, and competitors few. 
The almost completely shielded domestic market generated monopolistic and heavy 
oligopolistic enterprises which over time diversified into other existing or new 
product market areas. Many of these economic activities are controlled by a small 
number of economic conglomerates such as Delta Corporation, the TM group, etc., 
in which the foreign investment component is still very high. If the commercial 
farmers form a tight community of 4000 then for sure also the industrialists form an 
even smaller interrelated community of managers and shareholders. 
The most important post-independence feature has been the lack of industrial 
investment. Gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) was very low, and according 
to some (e.g. Green & Khadani), there was no net increase in the capital stock. The 
rate of investment (GFCF/GDP 1980) fell in real terms from 15,3 % in 1980 to an 
estimated low of 10,7 % by 1989 (in 1975 it was 20 %). It should be noted that the 
GDCF that did take place in the 80s, was to a large extent undertaken by the public 
sector, in the form of infrastructural provisions. 
Government take-overs via the Industrial Development Corporation have reduced 
South African shareholder interest, and appears to have been of a defensive nature. 
Although a small number of new and very large investment projects (e.g. 
rehabilitaion of ZISCO, the chemical paper and pulp project) are in the pipeline in 
the form of either joint venture or independent ventures the overall effect so far has 
been limited. 
It is difficult to get a reasonably balanced picture of the major constraints on 
investment. A recent survey reported the following factors influencing new invest-
ment (in order of importance): expected return on investment; forex availibility; 
insufficient local demand; business confidence (Hawkins et al., 1988). 
270 Whatever the success in Zimbabwe's industrial sector, the fact is that the investment 
rate has dramatically declined, as I already observed earlier. Formal sector employ-
ment has not kept pace with the rapid growth of the urban labour market. If one would 
make a simple population projection for the 12 main urban areas and if one would 
extrapolate current formal sector growth taking into account the lower growth rates 
in the public sector itself (in accordance with existing policies), then the formal sector 
employment shortfall may be estimated to get to some 620.000 for these 12 urban 
areas. For Harare alone the shortfall would be in the order of some 310.000 jobs in 
1995. This is nearly 80 % of entire formal sector employment in this city 
(360.000).(2) 
The unemployment crisis is an urban one and looms heavily on the horizon. The 
policy dilemmas of Zimbabwe get further complicated. During the recent parliamen-
tary elections ZUM scored its highest success in Harare and it's success is widely 
regarded as a protest vote. Also one, which I would guess, the government can hardly 
ignore. The latter means that very expensive investments in urban transport, urban 
infrastructure and housing will divert the already limited national resources away 
from the rural areas. 
I would submit that the decade of the 80s have represented to some extent a lost 
opportunity. An opportunity to pursue more vigorously a rural development strategy. 
The policies in the 1990s are less constrained on the rural side (in the sence that the 
Lancaster House agreement has expired) but they will have to count more seriously 
with the more vocal urban problems which also tend to require more expensive 
solutions. 
COMMENTS ON STONEMAN'S PAPER 
The industrialization debate as seen by Stoneman is dominated by two major issues: 
a. the Zimbabwe policy context and b. the World Bank policy advice. 
Zimbabwe policy context 
With regard to the Zimbabwe policy situation or context, I note some ambivalence 
in the paper. On the one hand the author asks the question of 'why the Government 
of Zimbabwe, inspired by marxism-leninism, and seeking greater equality, would 
want to preserve the inherited structures of state intervention and protection through 
control of foreign exchange and trade?'. From what I understand of the situation, I 
think the received view was that these inherited instruments gave the government of 
Zimbabwe the opportunity to decisively influence the structure of the economy. It 
271 gave the government of Zimbabwe awsome powers to control the economy. This 
was interpreted by some commentators as a very desirable starting point: the 
government of Zimbabwe had reached the 'commanding heights' of the economy 
and the socialist experiment could begin. 
Later on in this paper the author stresses that the Zimbabwe model has been a correct 
one, namely, of phased liberalisation with a careful monitoring of developments, to 
make sure that nobody suffers too much. 
I think that the real issue Colin Stoneman raises is not just why preserve such 
inherited instruments but implicitly he is asking: why were these instruments not 
really used to effectuate a change away from merely protecting the inherited 
industrial structure? This leads us to the next key question, namely, doing what 
instead? What would be a viable long term industrialization strategy? Is there any 
'grand scheme' at all? 
This same questioning is present in his remarks with regard to the Industrial 
Development Corporation. The IDC has taken major interests in a number of 
companies, but for what purpose? What difference does it make? 
Foreign exchange allocation has been at the center of attention in industrialization 
debates. The most surprising aspect of the actual practice of the forex allocation 
system, which according to almost all observers is the key instrument, is the lack of 
a clear sectoral prioritization. The major exception to this has been the forex 
allocation in relation to agriculture and agricultural inputs, where the private sector 
remained completely involved in the preparation of realistic bids. For all other 
(non-public sector) sectors the allocations have been based on historic importance 
and a very general (5-point) product rating as well as general criteria such as 
'importance of the rural sector'.(3) 
This is also evidenced by the fact that cuts in forex allocations, applied in times of 
extra hardship (e.g. in 1987) were 'across the board' i.e. the same for all applications. 
The share of 'industrial imports' (i.e. imports by firms except those related to 
agriculture) fell from 19,3 % of total forex earnings in 1979 to 8,9 % in 1985. 
The second development has been the growing importance of barter deals (Eastern 
European countries and Third World countries) and Commodity Import Programmes 
(USA - discontinued in 1986 -, Germany, UK, Japan, France, Holland and Scan-
dinavian countries etc.). These so-called ad-hoc allocations constitute between 20-30 
% of the total forex allocation to industry. By their very nature CIPs and barter deals 
cannot be at the core of Zimbabwean economic policy. 
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was not applied with any design in mind. It was not given out of hand. On the 
contrary, access to forex has become more and more an 'art', to put it euphemisti-
cally. 
It is also remarkable that companies in which the government of Zimbabwe obtained 
a major or controlling interest were not necessarily better off in terms of access to 
forex than non-government of Zimbabwe owned companies. At least this is a 
complaint that was heard in some quarters during interviews in 1987. 
The trade liberalization debate, in as far as it is public, suffers from a very similar 
problem: what sectors will get priority; which sectors will loose out, and what should 
the tariff structure be like? A phased liberalization looks fine, and indeed better than 
a big leap in the dark. But...with what priorities? 
Perhaps the most important motivation for some form of liberalization may not find 
its origin in international trade but in the domestic budget deficit. The budget deficit 
has been growing in the 80s. In 1985 it stood at 10 % of GDP and in 1989 it still 
remained at 9 % in spite of budget cuts and a healthy economic growth during the 
last two years. For the current financial year (1989/90) the servicing of debt (interest 
and loan repayments) stands at more than 1,6 billion dollars which is nearly as much 
as the combined annual budgets of Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health together. Further cuts in expenditures 
are seen as endangering post-independence achievements. The tax base has not 
increased very much in terms of taxpaying individuals and companies whereas the 
rates of existing taxes are already considered high. The abolition of quantity restric-
tions in favour of tariff protection may yield the much needed increase in state 
revenues. This argument may have relevance but its validity as a motivation for the 
policy shift towards liberalization cannot be ascertained. It remains sofar a specula-
tion. 
Lastly, it is important to make a distinction between 'de-bureaucratization' of forex 
allocation and 'liberalization' of foreign trade. It would seem that the business 
community is almost unanimous with regard to 'de-bureaucratization' i.e. simplify-
ing procedures and making them more transparant. The Sandura Commission which 
exposed corruption among high level civil servants and ministers may also have had 
an important influence in changing public attitudes towards administrative allocation 
mechanisms. Liberalizing foreign trade, meaning reducing the protection enjoyed by 
domestic producers for the domestic market, is quite something else. 
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To what extent was liberalization seen as a theoretical ideal for the white dominated 
business community? I think that here one needs to make a distinction between the 
first and the second half of the 1980s. 
I would submit that neither government of Zimbabwe nor the private sector were in 
favour of liberalization. Judging from Growth with Equity, Transitional National 
Development Plan and even the First Five Year National Development Plan, the 
government of Zimbabwe was not clearly committed to the idea of liberalization. 
The private sector was during the same period very much on the defensive. The 
Jansen report was not only controversial in a substantial sense, in particular in as far 
as the application of the DRC methodology, it was difficult to be accepted not only 
by the government of Zimbabwe but also by the private sector. 
During the 80s the private sector came to realise that in fact the government of 
Zimbabwe's intentions were indeed 'conservative'. It must have dawned on the 
private sector that the government of Zimbabwe would not launch a radical strategy 
but opted for the status quo. However, even under such circumstances the private 
sector would only be lukewarm about the idea of liberalization. A protected, even if 
stagnating, market is better than none. A dual strategy in which there is export 
promotion coupled to forex incentive for the protected domestic market is an 
attractive option which has now received some cautious support from the private 
sector. Note that only in 1987 such a global policy gained some verbal support from 
CZI. Now, in 1990, the government of Zimbabwe is yet to publish details on its 
liberalization. 
It appears indeed correct that, since recently, the government of Zimbabwe is more 
accomodating with regard to new foreign investment. The creation of the Investment 
Center and the publication of the 'Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations' 
document in April last year has been heplfull. 
Whether the marriage between the daughter of Chidzero and the World Bank 
Resident Representative's son is symbolic of the accomodation reached between the 
government of Zimbabwe and the World Bank, I do not know but the fact is that 
softening of attitudes appears to be mutual. The government of Zimbabwe is more 
and more underlining the importance of 'an active and viable private sector alongside 
a strong public sector'(4), the World Bank is currently revising its position and is 
preparing a new country review. 
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Bank when compared with other countries are quite different. Firstly, Zimbabwe has 
not suffered from the economic collapse which other countries have experienced 
(e.g. Zambia or Tanzania). Secondly, and for the same reason Zimbabwe has not had 
a structural adjustment predicament of a scale as Tanzania or Zambia. Thanks to its 
economic diversity (and not just its conservative policies), Zimbabwe has been in a 
far better position to whether external shocks. 
To what extent is the Zimbabwean model a 'success'? Stoneman does not answer 
this question clearly. Much would also depend on the criterion used. In the short run, 
it would appear to be affirmative. Some limited growth has taken place, both in output 
and even in terms of employment. However, in the long run the declining investment 
rate is problematic. The outdated capital stock will make new investment demanding 
more forex. Real wages have been falling below pre-independence levels. 
I would add that the Zimbabwean Model has been characterised by indecisiveness 
between concretizing radical aspirations and pragmatic day-to-day considerations. 
This indecisiveness may be rooted in many causes, e.g. the Lancaster House 
constraints, the internal division within the party, the pressure from outside, the 
conservatism of the bureaucracy, the limited 'technical' planning capacity or im-
plementation bottlenecks etc., but it has had costs in terms of declining investment, 
a serious unemployment crisis and if judged by the election outcomes also political 
costs in terms of votes. 
Other issues 
It appears to me that, relatively speaking, Zimbabwe is faced with important internal 
policy constraints. These domestic constraints appear to carry greater weight than 
external policy constraints. In comparison with other less diverse and more depend-
ent countries, Zimbabwe has had more room for developing its own brand of policy. 
However, internal contradictions and constraints have made it difficult to develop 
concrete policy alternatives different from the ones currently followed. 
A second point that needs to be taken into account concerns the internal dualism 
between the large peasant sector and the white dominated agro and industrial 
complex. A dualism that reveals itself on the demand and on the supply side. 
The demand side issue reminds me of the Latin American industrialization debate. 
There, import substituting industrialization had failed to develop the second and third 
stage of the import substitution strategy. In stead of deepening into more intermediate 
275 and capital goods production, industries moved increasingly to smaller but growing 
and profitable markets for high income products. The highly skewed and worsening 
distribution of income favoured this trend. Over time industries became less low-in-
come demand oriented. The more this happened, the more difficult it would be to 
generate an effective policy shift in favour of low income demand (e.g. Leff, 
1982)(5). 
Zimbabwe has a very similar problem: the per capita expenditure of households of 
main socio-economic categories is revealing in this respect: 
• average per capita expenditures in Communal Areas: ZW$ 263 
• average per capita expenditures in High density urban areas: ZW$ 675 
• average per capita expenditures in Low density urban areas: ZW$ 4934. 
(Source: Hifab/Zimconsult, 1989, Zimbabwe Country Study, p. 29) 
The actual expenditures in the last category are nearly 19 times the average in 
communal areas. There is no evidence to suggest that since 1985 these gaps have 
narrowed, in stead there are indications that they may have widened. 
The Latin American response has been a sidestep: namely export promotion. Can 
Zimbabwe follow this and is this desirable? There is one important handicap: 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country with a small domestic market and hence less 
capable of developing the Latin American answer of export diversification. Would 
it not be desirable to expand the domestic market via a redistribution of (under-
utilised) assets such as land? 
The dualism on the supply side is equally serious. There is a big gap between the 
white dominated industrial sector and the black dominated rural industries. The 
promotion of small scale industrialization and advancement of black entrepreneur-
ship (to be distinguished from 'emergent briefcase' businessmen!) have met with 
very lukewarm government of Zimbabwe support to put it very positively. Small 
scale and new enterprises have suffered much more than large and established 
enterprises from access to forex and problems with the administrative forex alloca-
tion system.(6) 
There is a widespread agreement now that the expansion of the formal sector, in 
particular the manufacturing sector, cannot make more than a dent in the unemploy-
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estimated to be ZW$ 49.000 in 1985 prices (Hawkins et al.). In his paper Stoneman 
states that the investment requirements have now risen to at least ZW$ 100.000 per 
job. Staggering investment sums would be required to provide full formal sector 
employment. Let us be reminded in this context that the per capita annual consump-
tion expenditures in the communal areas were ZW$ 236 (in 1985). 
A very practical example could be to respond to the rapid urbanization and conse-
quent need for housing in all market segments with a policy of promoting the 
construction and construction materials industry, both formal and informal, which 
generally has a low import content, and is labour intensive. In fact the construction 
industry itself is currently the sector with the highest employment growth, but suffers 
from shortages (surprisingly, cement is being exported to South Africa). 
The same applies to the horticulture and agro-processing sector. The Agricultural 
Development Authority is beginning to develop smallholder schemes in fruits and 
vegetables, with the financial assistance of the EEC. 
Perhaps Zimbabwe would not be better off with a grand scheme. I would agree with 
Colin Stoneman that in Zimbabwe there were grand and radical aspirations and, at 
the same time, a lot of conservative day-to-day management of the economy. 
However, this may also be indicative of the difficulty to translate grand schemes into 
practical and concrete (and well founded) policies. I was somewhat surprised by the 
rather strong dismissal by Stoneman of the TNDP and the lack of references to the 
other major 'Plan Documents'. The point is that without these there are very few 
policy documents left. 
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278 Discussion STONEMAN 
Colin STONEMAN 
I may have given a false impression when talking about export promotion. By this I 
was not suggesting the type of export oriented industrialisation policy, whereby the 
export market is the motor of industrialisation and development. I am not in favour 
of that model, that has been chosen by certain Latin American countries. I was talking 
about promotion of export in a purely instrumental way: there is a critical shortage 
of foreign exchange for the development of the internal market, for the expansion of 
industrialisation, so as to bring in the rest of the population that is outside the 
industrial enclave for the moment. It is, like it or not, to generate the foreign exchange 
so as to back up this industrialisation process. Foreign exchange is easily identifiable 
as the key constraint on further investment and therefore export has to be promoted. 
That is a different thing from advocating export-led growth. 
Doeke FABER 
You didn't go into the possibilities that in the future the SADCC might well provide 
the possibility for expanded industrialisation: have you thought on that ? 
If you know that an additional workplace would cost ZW $ 100.000, have you not 
thought about a different alternative that would be able to absorb these people that 
are added every year to the labour force. It is nice to look at what has happened, but 
if you look at the ways Zimbabwe has to follow, you have not really come up with 
any realistic avenues along which Zimbabwe could develop. 
Colin STONEMAN 
Regarding the SADCC, it is fairly easy to say what should happen in principle: there 
are publications by the SADCC about cooperation between the countries so that they 
should specialise in different activities, including inside the industry. 
279 Just one example for the textile industry. All textile would be processed on the basis 
of Angolan oil, which would be polymerised in a plant in Zambia and spun in other 
plants in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and finally made into textiles and cloths 
in other factories in all countries of the region. That looked a coherent plan in terms 
of the availibility of resources and the relative need for the number of plants: you 
need one polymerisation plant, and there were reasons for siting it in Zambia. 
That's the sort of logical answer that the SADCC hoped it would be able to give. But 
there are too many problems for making that sort of regional planning realistic, 
associated with nationalism. Zimbabwe really doesn't see why Zambia should have 
these plants when it thinks it can build and operate them better. Even if the plants 
are built and if the size of the SADCC market says there is only room for one plant 
in the region, what happens? The other countries that don't have the plants need 
foreign exchange to buy the output with and so you get into the question to ensure 
that they do have the foreign exchange. In practice, the plant gets built with foreign 
aid and then only produces for the country that it is built in, at 20 % output, very 
inefficiently. 
Again, I am listing the problems rather than giving the answers: the answer is easy 
on paper, but very difficult to achieve in practice. One of the problems is that a lot 
of things need to happen at once: you need to solve the problem of how to trade by 
an increased range of export revolving funds and while at the same time making the 
first moves towards a regional currency. But all these things depend on each other. 
In principle it might be achievable and with a liberated South Africa it might be 
easier. We are talking about South Africa as a dynamic member of a coordinating 
body like the SADCC, not as a member of a free trade area, which might have 
desastrous consequences for some of the other countries. 
The short answer to your other question about what to do to raise employment levels. 
Basically what I did point to, although too briefly in my paper, was the impossibility 
of investing enough to create the number of jobs needed. Even if this investment 
ratio was raised to 20 % or 30 % or even to 40 %, it would be very easy to show that 
- at a cost of ZW $ 100.000 per job - you would only be creating jobs for a quarter 
of the school leavers. This means that you would have to get into rural industrialisa-
tion, the type of solutions that Dr. Helmsing is talking about. You have to invest in 
labour intensive jobs and I don't believe that this can happen on a market basis. This 
must happen with state suppport - e.g. through inputs provision like providing 
standard metal shapes fore village blacksmiths - and than the output for a long period 
is not going to be internationally competitive. This is why I say a measure of 
protection does have to be maintained and probably is best maintained by controls 
rather than by tariffs. If you can get the cost per job down to ZW $ 10.000, which is 
still a lot of money, this is going to bring an amazing increase in productivity but it 
280 is at the cost of the protection of the economy as a whole. Alongside that, there has 
to be an internationally competitive second leg, as I was indicating earlier, to export 
so as to provide the necessary foreign exchange for essential inputs. 
François WATERKEYN 
You say that trade with the PTA is very marginal compared with the trade with the 
other countries, especially with the North, but if you look at a field like transport, 
where I am in, you will see that, when Zimbabwe can compete freely in international 
bids, e.g. in the field of wagons, in Uganda, Tanzania, it gets all the orders. It means 
Zimbabwean companies are highly competitive for bids where there is financing, 
e.g. from the EC, the World Bank or another international organisation. The PTA 
trade could be improved also in other areas if the financial flows could flow freely 
within those countries. 
Colin STONEMAN 
In practice, the PTA as an organisation has not been very succesfull. Those major 
wagon orders were highly exceptional and depending on aid funding for their 
financing. I don't think that it depended on the importing countries being members 
of the PTA, it was a straight commercial deal. 
François WATERKEYN 
They were competing with many Western European companies: they were more 
competitive because of the transport cost and because of other factors, but they were 
competitive. This means that an export oriented growth can be sustained even if they 
have to compete with European companies - maybe not with South African com-
panies, because these would also have the advantage of transport -, provided the 
financial flows can be channelled through different countries in Africa and the PTA 
region. 
281 Colin STONEMAN 
They would certainly be competitive in the region and I would certainly favour an 
expansion of markets in the region. But if you talk to Zimbabwean exporters they 
will tell you the problem is always the foreign exchange shortage in the countries 
they want to export to. 
I favour exports into the region but I am not sure that the PTA as an institution has 
greatly promoted the possibility of doing this. The key factor is not only the 
preference that might be given to Zimbabwe as a PTA member but the binding 
constraint of the availability of foreign exchange in the region. 
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